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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many nations have experienced episodes of sovereign default, some of the most recent
being Russia in 1998, Ecuador in 1999, and Argentina in 2001. Quantitative models
have been developed (based on the willingness to pay approach) to study these episodes
(see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2005), Bai and Zhang (2005),
Cuadra and Sapriza (2006a, 2006b), Lizarazo (2005), and Yue (2005)). In these models,
the government maximizes the utility of a representative agent by deciding how much
to save and whether to default on its debt. In particular, the government issues bonds
that are priced in a competitive market. In general, it is assumed that two costs follow
a default episode. First, there is an output loss. Second, countries are exogenously
excluded from capital markets. The exogenous exclusion assumption may appear to
be at odds with the assumption of competitive lenders. It is unlikely that after a
default episode, competitive creditors could coordinate to cut oﬀ credit to defaulting
countries (see, for example, Cole, Dow, and English (1995), and Athreya and Janicki
(2006)). Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that once other variables are control
for, market access is not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by previous defaults (see, for example,
Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2003)).
In this paper, we study a standard quantitative model of sovereign default but, in
contrast with previous quantitative studies, we do not assume that a defaulting country
is exogenously excluded from capital markets. A borrower’s ability to obtain loans
depends only on the probability of repay. However, we ﬁnd that when we consider that
governments with diﬀerent willingness to pay alternate in power, diﬃculties to access
capital markets are likely to appear endogenously after a default episode.2
Emerging markets typically face large political uncertainty. In particular, fragile and
often unstable political institutions have been the norm in Latin America. Most Latin
American countries have weaker public institutions than those found in the investment-
grade countries of Europe and Asia, a factor that contributes to their more volatile
economic performance. Signiﬁcant increases in short term interest rate volatility from
political risk has been evidenced in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela in 2005.
These features suggest that political uncertainty may have a signiﬁcant role on eco-
nomic ﬂuctuations. Moreover, empirical studies point out the importance of political
factors in determining spreads (see, for example, Citron and Nickelsburg (1987), Balkan
(1992), Li (1992), Rivoli and Brewer (1997), Catao and Sutton (2002), and Jahjah and
Yue (2004)). These studies ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the probability of
default and political indicators, thus underscoring the relevance of political factors as a
determinant of a country’s credit worthiness. This suggests that there is heterogeneity
in the governments’ willingness to repay.
Our paper models such feature and shows how considering government heterogeneity
can improve the quantitative performance of the standard model of sovereign default.
We allow the composition of the government or the distribution of power within the
government to change each period. We model this in a very stylized way by assuming
that two types of governments with diﬀerent patience alternate in power–the patient
government discounts future utility ﬂows less than the impatient government.
With our benchmark parametrization, even though impatient governments assign
more weight to current consumption, they decide to borrow less than patient govern-
ments. This is the case because impatient governments are more likely to default
and, therefore, face higher borrowing costs. Consequently, in their ﬁr s tp e r i o di no f -3
ﬁce, impatient governments typically ﬁnd themselves with a debt level higher than the
maximum debt level they would choose to pay. Therefore, in our simulations, most
default episodes–approximately 75%–arise when a patient government is replaced by
an impatient one.
Consequently, even without assuming exogenous exclusion, the model generates dif-
ﬁculties in market access after a default episode–after default episodes, because impa-
tient governments are more likely to be in power, for the same level of debt, average
spreads are higher; moreover, the equilibrium debt level is lower. That is, after default,
capital inﬂows are initially decreased, and later recover slowly. This is consistent with
the observed governments’ reluctance to issue new debt after defaulting.
Furthermore, consistently with historical evidence, in our model, market access im-
proves after the defaulting government loses power. A clear example is discussed by
Cole, Dow, and English (1995); they explain that “the ability of Reconstruction gov-
ernments in Florida and Mississippi to borrow after the Civil War suggests that the old
creditors could not block new loans once the states’ reputations had been restored by an
observable change in regime.”
It will also be shown that considering heterogeneous borrowers allows the standard
model to generate the default probability observed in the data–the default probability is
much lower in the benchmark without heterogeneity. Consequently, our model generates
higher spreads–closer to the data. The alternation in power of diﬀerent government
types is crucial to generate a higher default probability. The default probability is
higher in an economy where patient and impatient governments alternate in power than
in an economy with only impatient (or patient) governments.
In general, equilibrium spreads depend on the equilibrium probability of default4
which depends on the probability of facing a government likely to pay in the future.
In our stylized model, the probability of facing a government likely to pay (patient) in
the future depends on the type of the government in power which changes over time
generating volatility in spreads. Thus, the model produces higher spread volatility–
closer to the volatility in the data–than a model without heterogeneity.
The paper also provides insights on how do changes in government stability impact
on the default risk, and thus, on spreads. We shall also describe the strategic interaction
of governments with diﬀerent patience.
1.1 Related literature
Cuadra and Sapriza (2006b) also present a quantitative model of sovereign default in
which diﬀerent governments alternate in power. However, these governments disagree
on the optimal allocation of resources within each period (see also Amador (2005), and
Azzimonti Renzo (2005)), but assign the same weight to the future and, therefore, they
do not diﬀer in their willingness to repay. That is, governments are homogeneous from
a lender’s point of view. Their analysis also imposes exogenous restrictions to credit
market access after default.
Cole, Dow, and English (1995) study sovereign default with heterogeneous borrowers
and asymmetric information about the borrower’s type, but their study is not quanti-
tative. They focus on equilibria in which the default history reveals the type. As in
our framework, default episodes are associated with impatient borrowers, but in their
paper, only impatient governments default. They assume that resources or obligations
cannot be transfer from one period to another period and, therefore, there is no room
for strategic interaction between government types. Moreover, governments do not de-5
cide the amount they borrow, which is decided by the lenders–who oﬀer either a ﬁxed
positive amount (when they believe the government may be patient) or zero (when they
know the government is impatient). In their paper, the impatient government always
defaults on obligations it contracted on before its type was known. In our framework,
a more impatient government may default on obligations contracted by a more patient
government in the past, because the patient government borrowed more than what the
impatient government is willing to pay. Chatterjee, Corbae, and Rios-Rull’s (2005)
study bankruptcy with heterogenous borrowers. In their model, the borrower’s type is
its private information while in our environment types are public information. They
also assume that a borrower’s type changes over time while we assume borrowers of
diﬀerent types alternate in power–this seems more appropriate for studying sovereign
default. They also assume that the impatient type always default, and they only allow
for three levels of savings. Besides considering heterogeneous borrowers, and removing
the assumption on exogenous exclusion, we follow exactly the standard model in recent
quantitative studies of sovereign default (see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
Arellano (2005), Cuadra and Sapriza (2006a, 2006b), Lizarazo (2005), and Yue (2005)).
Diﬃculties in market access after a default episode may also be an equilibrium
outcome in studies focusing on inﬁnitely repeated games (see Miller, Tomz, and Wright
(2005) and the references therein). These studies assume that competitive creditors
can coordinate, and do not present quantitative assessments.
2 The model
Our model builds on the standard framework with trend shocks presented in Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) (hereafter denoted by AG). There is a single tradable good. The6






























=0 ,w h e r eσ denotes the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion and β denotes the discount factor.
The objective of the government is to maximize the present value of future utility






We allow the composition of the government or the distribution of power within the
government to change each period. We model this by assuming that two types of
governments alternate in power. Patient governments discount future utility ﬂows at
ar a t eβh, and impatient governments discounts future utility ﬂows at a rate βl,w h e r e
βh > βl. There is a constant exogenous probability π of a change in government type.
The government in power makes two decisions. First it decides whether to refuse to
pay previously issued debt. Second, it decides how much to borrow or save for the
following period.
As in previous quantitative studies, we assume there are two costs of defaulting.
First, after default, the country may be excluded from capital markets. We assume
that in each period (including the default period), the country regains access to capital
1The endowment process is motivated by the work of Aguiar and Gopinath (2004). They ﬁnd that
shocks to trend growth (rather than transitory ﬂuctuations around a stable trend) are the primary
source of ﬂuctuations in emerging markets. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show that the ability of their
model of sovereign default to match the data is improved when trend shocks are included.7
markets with probability φ ∈ [0,1].2 In contrast with previous quantitative studies, we
will consider the case of φ =1(no exogenous exclusion). Second, we assume that if a
country has defaulted on its debt, it faces an exogenous “output loss” of λ percent in
the following period.3
The government can choose to save or borrow using one period bonds. These assets
are priced in a competitive market. There is a large number of identical, inﬁnitely lived
foreign lenders. Each lender can borrow or lend at the risk free rate r and can lend in a
perfectly competitive market to the small open economy. The individual lender is risk
neutral. Creditors have perfect information regarding the economy’s endowment.
Let b denote the current position in bonds. Each bond delivers one unit of the good
next period for a price of q this period. A negative value of b denotes that the country
was an issuer of bonds in the previous period.
The government can issue as many bonds as it wants, but the issue price of these
bonds is not constant because it depends on how likely is that the country defaults
on the following period. Competitive lenders will oﬀer a price qjd(b0,y,g) for each
bond if the country decides to issue −b0 bonds. This price satisﬁes the lenders’ zero
proﬁt condition. It depends on the government type, j, and on its default decision, d.
The former is due to the fact that the type conveys information about the probability
distribution of future types, and therefore it aﬀects the probability distribution of next
period default decisions. The latter is due to the fact that a current default decreases
2Previous quantitative studies assume that the government cannot borrow in the period it defaults.
We allow the government to access the capital market in the default period with probability φ so
that when we want to eliminate the exogenous exclusion (and we set φ =1 ), the government is not
exogenously excluded in the default period.
3Previous quantitative studies assume that after default, the country suﬀer the output loss for a
stochastic number of periods (the periods in which the country is excluded from capital markets). For
simplicity, we do not do the same. Otherwise, when we assume that there is no exogenous exclusion
(φ =1 ) and, therefore, the country can default in consecutive periods, we would have to keep track of
the number of output losses the country is suﬀering.8
future output and aﬀects future default decisions.
The exclusion state is determined at the beginning of each period. If the country
was not excluded from ﬁnancial markets at the end of the previous period, it is not
excluded at the beginning of the current period. If the country was excluded at the
end of the previous period, it is excluded at the beginning of the current period with
probability 1 − φ. When participating in ﬁnancial markets, the government compares
two value functions: Vj1 (y,g,h) and Vj0 (b,y,g,h). The former denotes the value
function under default of a government of type j, when the country has a credit history
h.T h e v a r i a b l e h takes a value of 1 when the country defaulted in the previous period,
and takes a value of 0 when the country did not default in the previous period. The
second value function denotes the value function of government j when it did not default,
and it has to pay −b at the beginning of the period.
Let x denote the exclusion state. The variable x takes a value of 1 when the
country is excluded, and takes a value of 0 otherwise. Let Vj(b,y,g,h,x) denote j’s
value function at the beginning of a period if j is in power, and Wj(b,y,g,h,x) denote
j’s value function at the beginning of a period if j is not in power–since a government’s
decisions are inﬂuenced by its type, Vj and Wj do not need to coincide. After default,
the value function of the government is given by
Vj1 (y,g,h)=φ˜ Vj1 (y,g,h,0) + (1 − φ) ˜ Vj1 (y,g,h,1)9
where
˜ Vj1 (y,g,h,1) =
u(y(1 − hλ)) + ...
βj
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is the value function for a defaulting government that is excluded, and
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gives the dynamic programming problem for a defaulting government that is not ex-
cluded.
The value function of j when it has decided to pay back the debt is obtained from
the following Bellman equation
Vj0 (b,y,g)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
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The function Vj (b,y,g,h,x) is computed as follows:
Vj (b,y,g,h,0) = max{Vj1 (b,y,g,h),V j0 (b,y,g,h)},
and
Vj (b,y,g,h,1) =
u(y(1 − hλ)) + ...
βj
⎡





⎣ φWj(0,y0,g0,0,0) + ...
(1 − φ)Wj(0,y0,g0,0,1)
⎤




⎣ φVj(0,y0,g0,0,0) + ...
(1 − φ)Vj(0,y0,g0,0,1)
⎤
⎦Fg (dg0 | g)
⎤








1 if Vj1 (y,g,h) >V j0 (b,y,g,h)
0 if Vj1 (y,g,h) ≤ Vj0 (b,y,g,h)
.
denote the default decision of government j. The function Wj (b,y,g,h,x) is computed
as follows:
Wj (b,y,g,h,1) =
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j1 (y,g,h) denotes the optimal saving behavior of government j after default
(when j is not excluded), and b0
j0 (b,y,g,h) denotes the optimal savings of government
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⎤
⎦.11
T h ep r i c eo fab o n di s s u e db yg o v e r n m e n tj if a default decision d was made in the
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denotes the probability that government j decides to default if the current government
purchases b0 bonds, the current endowment is y, the growth rates is g,a n dt h ec u r r e n t
default decision is d.
3 A benchmark with homogeneous borrowers and exoge-
nous exclusion
In this section we present results with exogenous exclusion and homogeneous borrowers.
That is, we assume that φ < 1,a n dt h a tβh = βl = β. We shall show that our
benchmark produces results that are very similar to the results in previous studies–
even though in our benchmark there is only one period of output loss, and a defaulting
country may not be excluded in the default period.
When possible, we use the calibration in AG. Parameter values are presented in
Table 1.12
Table 1. Parameter values
Risk aversion σ 2
Interest rate r 1%
Probability of redemption φ 10%
Mean growth rate µg 1.006
Autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρg 0.17
Standard deviation σg 3%
Discount factor β 0.8
Loss of output λ 10%
The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 2 is standard. Each period refers to a
quarter with a quarterly risk free interest rate of 1%. The probability of redemption
implies an average stay in autarky of 2.5 years as in AG–in their paper, the probability
of redemption is 10% but a defaulting country is excluded with probability one in the
ﬁrst period. The process of output is calibrated to match the process for Argentina
(see AG). As in previous studies, high impatience is necessary to generate default in
equilibrium. As explained above, in our framework, the costs of default are slightly
diﬀerent from the costs in previous studies–the country may not be excluded in the
default period, and the loss of output occurs in only one period. In order to make our
results comparable with the results in previous studies, we pick a value of λ that gives
us the default probability in AG.
To solve the model numerically, we ﬁr s tr e c a s tt h eB e l l m a ne quations in detrended
form. As in AG, to detrend, we normalize all variables by µgyt−1. Table 2 reports key
business cycle moments in the data (Argentina; 1983.1-2000.2), from our benchmark
simulations, and from Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2006) (hereafter denoted by13
HMS).4 Standard deviations are denoted by σ (), and are reported in percentage terms;
correlations are denoted by ρ(). W el o gt h ei n c o m e( Y ) and consumption series and
compute the trade balance (TB) and (annualized) interest rate spread (Rs). All series
are HP ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. The log of income and consumption
are denoted by y and c respectively. Table 2 shows that our benchmark produces results
that are consistent with the results in previous studies–even though in our benchmark
there is only one period of output loss, and a defaulting country may not be excluded
in the default period.
Table 2. Benchmark 1 (with exogenous exclusion)
Data HMS Benchmark 1
σ(y) 4.08 4.43 4.43
σ(c) 4.85 4.64 4.66
σ(TB/Y) 1.36 0.65 0.72
σ(Rs) 3.17 0.01 0.02
ρ(c,y) 0.96 0.99 0.99
ρ(TB/Y,y) -0.89 -0.26 -0.25
ρ(Rs,y) -0.59 -0.07 -0.11
ρ(Rs,TB/Y) 0.68 0.91 0.92
Rate of default (per 10,000 quarters) 75 22 22
Mean debt output ratio (%) 19 21
Maximum Rs (basis point) 97 96
4HMS recalculate the business cycle moments in AG. The data for Argentina is from AG. We
simulate the model for 10,000 periods and extract the last 500 observations to rule out any eﬀect of
initial conditions. We run 500 such simulations. We compute the business cycle moments from our
simulations without considering the exclusion periods and without considering the ﬁrst two periods after
exclusion–in these period, the government does not borrow much and, consequently, it pays very low
spreads (see HMS).14
4 A benchmark with homogeneous borrowers and with-
out exogenous exclusion (TO BE COMPLETED)
In this section we present results with homogeneous borrowers and without exogenous
exclusion. That is, we assume that φ =1 ,a n dt h a tβh = βl = β. Previous studies
assume that after defaulting countries are exogenously excluded from capital markets
(φ < 1). The exogenous exclusion assumption may appear to be at odds with the as-
sumption of competitive lenders. It is unlikely that after a default episode, competitive
creditors could coordinate to cut oﬀ credit to defaulting countries (see, for example,
Cole, Dow, and English (1995), and Athreya and Janicki (2006)). Moreover, empirical
evidence indicates that once other variables are control for, market access is not signif-
icantly inﬂuenced by previous defaults (see, for example, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris
(2003)).
Figure 1 shows that the average debt level is very similar before and after a default
episode–the ﬁrst period after default the government does not borrow much because
its debt level is low. That is, the model does not generate diﬃculties in market access
after a default episode. This is inconsistent with the observed governments’ reluctance
to issue new debt after defaulting.
Table 3 shows the business cycle statistics calculated without exogenous exclusion–
to facilitate comparisons, we also report the statistics in the data and from the model
with exogenous exclusion.5
5The business cycle statistics without exogenous exclusion are calculated considering all periods. We
plan to recalculate these statistics without considering outliers (see HMS).15
Figure 1:
Table 3. Benchmark 2 (with exogenous exclusion)
Data Benchmark 1 Benchark2
σ(y) 4.08 4.43 4.45
σ(c) 4.85 4.66 4.51
σ (TB/Y) 1.36 0.72 0.35
σ (Rs) 3.17 0.02 0.03
ρ(c,y) 0.96 0.99 1
ρ(TB/Y,y) -0.89 -0.25 -0.15
ρ(Rs,y) -0.59 -0.11 0.20
ρ(Rs,TB/Y) 0.68 0.92 0
Rate of default (per 10,000 quarters) 75 22 18
Mean debt output ratio (%) 21 8
Maximum Rs (basis point) 96 115
Table 3 shows that the mean debt level generated by the model is lower without16
exclusion. Moreover, when exogenous exclusion is not assumed, spreads are procyclical,
and there is no correlation between spreads and trade balances.
5 Heterogenous borrowers (TO BE COMPLETED)
In this section, we allow the composition of the government or the distribution of power
within the government to change each period. In particular, we allow the government’s
willingness to pay to change over time We model this by assuming that two types of
governments alternate in power. The patient government discounts future utility ﬂows
less than the impatient government, that is, we assume that βh > βl. It is also assumed
that φ =1 , that is, the economy is never exogenously excluded from capital markets,
and the government’s ability to obtain loans depends only on the probability of repay.
We show how allowing for government heterogeneity can improve the quantitative
performance of the standard model of sovereign default. We ﬁnd that even without
assuming exogenous exclusion, the model generates diﬃculties in market access after
default episodes–for the same level of debt, average spreads are higher. Moreover,
after default, capital inﬂows are initially decreased, and later recover slowly. This is
consistent with the observed governments’ reluctance to issue new debt after default-
ing. Furthermore, consistently with historical evidence, in our model, market access
improves after the defaulting government loses power. We also show that considering
heterogeneous borrowers allows the standard model to generate the default probability
observed in the data, and consequently it allows it to generate higher spreads than a
model without heterogeneity. The model also generates higher volatility in spreads
than a model without heterogeneity. We also provide insights on how do changes in
government stability impact on the default risk, and thus, on spreads. We shall also17
describe the strategic interaction of governments with diﬀerent patience. As previous
studies, we also capture some of the main empirical regularities regarding emerging
markets.
First, we assume that the βh =0 .9 and βl =0 .6. That is, we assume that patient
governments are more patient than governments in the benchmarks presented in sections
3 and 4, and impatient governments are more impatient than governments in those
benchmarks. We also present results with alternative parametrizations and we explain
the role of both the patience level and the patience variability.
If the model generates default episodes when a patient government is replaced with
an impatient government, the probability of a change in the government type, π,i s
closely related with the default probability. We calibrate π to match the default prob-
ability in the data. Following AG, Table 2 reports a default probability in the data of
0.75% that is consistent with the average number of crisis for emerging markets with at
least one default or restructuring episode between 1824 and 1999 presented by Reinhart,
Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003). First we assume that π =0 .015. With this value for
π, if the model generates default episodes when a patient government is replaced with
an impatient government, the probability of this type of default is 0.75% (this para-
metrization is preliminary, we ﬁnd that both patient and impatient governments may
default without a government change; the total default probability generated with this
parametrization is 0.97%).
Figures 2 shows the levels of assets and growth for which each government type
would choose to default. The grey area is the region for which both types would
default, and the black area is the region for which only an impatient government would
default. As one would expect, this ﬁgure shows that impatient governments are more18
Figure 2:
likely to default.
Figures 3 shows the bond price that a patient government faces for the average
growth rate. The price function in Figure 3 is close to a step function. With low
debt levels, no government would default, and spreads are low (bond prices are high).
With intermediate debt levels, only impatient governments would default, and spreads
are intermediate. With high debt levels, both government types would default, and
spreads are very high.
Figure 4 shows the objective function for this government for b = −0.083–given
that this function is not concave, we use global search to ﬁnd the optimal borrowing
level; the government would choose a low level of debt for low initial debts and low
output growth rates, but this does not occur in our simulations. It shows that patient





In a model without heterogeneous governments, there are no “intermediate” spreads
(see Figure 3). That is, bond prices fall sharply between the high price and the low
price. Consequently, the government always chooses to pay low spreads.
Thus, we show that introducing government heterogeneity helps the standard frame-
work to generate higher spreads–closer to the data. The maximum annualized spread
generated in the benchmark is 112 basis points (see Table 3), and with heterogenous
governments, the maximum spread is 670 basis points.
Figures 5 shows the bond price that a impatient government faces for the average
growth rate. As the price function in Figure 3, the price function in Figure 4 is also
close to a step function. The intermediate step in Figure 5 is very close to zero because
the impatient government is very likely to stay in power and, therefore, the default
probability is very high for the intermediate debt levels.21
Figure 6:
Figure 6 shows the objective function for this government for a b = −0.083.I t
shows that impatient governments would choose a “low” level of debt and, therefore,
would pay a low spread.
Consequently, with our benchmark parametrization, even though impatient gov-
ernments assign more weight to current consumption, they decide to borrow less than
patient governments. This is the case because impatient governments are more likely
to default and, therefore, face higher borrowing costs.
In our simulations, in their ﬁr s tp e r i o di no ﬃce, impatient governments typically ﬁnd
themselves with a debt level higher than the maximum debt level they would choose
to pay. Approximately 75% of the default episodes arise when a patient government
is replaced by an impatient one. The default probability is 0.99% considerably higher
than the default probability with homogenous governments (0.18%; see Table 3). The
alternation in power of diﬀerent government types is crucial to generate a higher default22
Figure 7:
probability. The default probability in an economy with only impatient governments
(βl = βh =0 .6) is 0.38%.
Even without assuming exogenous exclusion, the model generates diﬃculties in mar-
ket access after a default episode. Figure 7 shows that the average debt level before and
after a default episode. After default episodes, impatient governments are more likely
to be in power and, therefore, the equilibrium debt level is lower–the ﬁrst period after
default the government borrow less because its debt level is low. That is, after default,
capital inﬂows are initially decreased, and later recover slowly. This is consistent with
the observed governments’ reluctance to issue new debt after defaulting. Furthermore,
consistently with historical evidence, in our model, market access improves after the de-
faulting government loses power. Given that in the model there is a cost of defaulting
that does not depend on the level of debt (the output loss), there are low enough debt
levels such that no government would default. Consequently, every government can23
borrow these levels at the risk free rate, and there is never zero borrowing.
In general, equilibrium spreads depend on the equilibrium probability of default
which depends on the probability of facing a government likely to pay in the future.
In our stylized model, the probability of facing a government likely to pay (patient) in
the future depends on the type of the government in power which changes over time
generating volatility in spreads. Thus, the model produces higher spread volatility–
closer to the volatility in the data–than a model without heterogeneity.
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